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Conflict of Laws-1964 Tennessee Survey
Elliott E. Cheatham*
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
II. THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS
III JUDGMENTS
A. Divisible Divorce and Matrimonial Domicile
B. Custody of Children
C. A Foreign Decree of Probate
D. Action on a Sister State Verdict
IV. TORTS
A. Problems of Coordination or Choice of Laws
V. CONTRACTS
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The language of the typical state statute is general and unlimited
in terms, as, "a contract," "any tort, "every will , as if the statute
should be applied to all cases involving such a matter in the courts
of the state. Ordinarily, statutes originate and are drafted with
thought only to matters within the state. When the matter in issue
occurs wholly or partly in another state, it would be an error to deter-
mine the reach and application of the statute merely from the general-
ity of its language. In the absence of specific direction this should be
determined in the light of the principles of conflict of laws, which
themselves take into account the policy of the local law. This was
pointed out in Bearman v. Camatsos, which involved the effect of the
foreign probate of a will and which is discussed below.'
II. TBm JuIsIoN OF CouRTs
The Tennessee Law Revision Commission has announced that a
subject of its study and report to the 1965 General Assembly is juris-
diction over foreign corporations. The ensuing legislation as well as
the report and its supporting study will be of great importance.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Professor Emeritus of Law, Columbia
University.




A. Divisible Divorce and Matrimonial Domicile
Beginning in 1942 with the first case of Williams v. North Carolina,
2
the Supreme Court of the United States has remade the law on sister
state divorce decrees. A case in the Court of Appeals of Tennessee,
Burton v. Burton,3 involved the question whether the decree of the
state of matrimonial domicile is to be given special effect. There,
a Tennessee woman married a Texas man and went to live in Texas.
Some years later she was turned out of the house by him, so she
alleges, and returned to Tennessee to live. The husband obtained
a divorce in Texas, apparently without personal jurisdiction over the
wife or participation by her in the proceedings. The divorced wife
brought the present suit in Tennessee for separate maintenance, and
the husband set up the Texas divorce as a bar. The first Williams
case 4 made clear that the state of the domicile of one spouse can grant
a divorce which must be given full faith and credit in its effect of
ending the personal relation between the spouses, even though there
was no personal jurisdiction over the respondent spouse. Other cases
have made equally clear that such a divorce, though good in ending
the personal aspects of the marital relationship, may not be good
enough to end the economic relationships as well. As Mr. Justice
Douglas put it in the leading case of Estin v. Estin,5 "The result in
this situation is to make the divorce divisible-to give effect to the
Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital status and to make it
ineffective on the issue of alimony."6 The principle that the economic
relationship may have continuing protection despite the good sister
state divorce began with a case in which the wife had secured a
decree of alimony in the state of matrimonial domicile of the spouses
before the foreign divorce decree was granted.7 It has been extended
to protect the wife in the award of a decree for support awarded after
the divorce decree, as in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,8 where the Supreme
Court of the United States stated:
Since the wife was not subject to its jurisdiction, the Nevada divorce court
had no power to extinguish any right which she had under the law of New
York to financial support from her husband. It has long been the constitu-
tional rule that a court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation
unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant [citing Pennoyer
2. 317 U.S. 387 (1942).
3. 376 S.W.2d 504 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963).
4. Supra note 2.
5. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
6. Id. at 549.
7. Supra note 5.
8. 354 U.S. 416 (1957), affirming 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E.2d 553 (1956).
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v. Neff9 ] . . . . Therefore, the Nevada decree, to the extent it purported to
affect the wife's right to support, was void.10
Many years earlier the Supreme Court of Tennessee had made a
similar distinction in the leading case of Toncray v. Toncray,1 in
which it awarded alimony to a Tennessee woman whose husband
had been granted a divorce in Virginia.
In the Burton case 12 the court of appeals, in denying protection to
the divorced wife's economic interest, relied on the fact that the
divorce was granted in the state of matrimonial domicile. Should
and does the matrimonial domicile have special power in divorce
proceedings? It was long the rule that it did have greater power in
granting a divorce and that the full faith and credit clause would
protect its decree ending the personal relationship. The first Williams
case,13 however, denied to it any special power: "[S]o far as state
power is concerned, no distinction between a matrimonial domicil and
a domicil later acquired has been suggested or is apparent."'
14
It seems doubtful that the matrimonial domicile should have any
special power in ending the economic relationship of the spouses. The
state with the most important interest in the continued support of the
wife is not the state of matrimonial domicile, but the state in which she
later resides and which will have to carry the burden of her support
if it is not borne by the divorcing husband. In the Burton case Ten-
nessee was her old home to which she returned after the divorce.
B. Custody of Children
In custody cases problems of judicial jurisdiction and of full faith
and credit to judgments frequently become intertwined. The Supreme
Court of the United States has not spoken clearly on these matters,
as the Supreme Court of Tennessee pointed out in Coury v. State.15
This case involved prolonged litigation first in Oklahoma and then in
Tennessee over the custody of children, who had been allowed by
an order of the Oklahoma court to move to Tennessee and there live
with their mother. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the
Circuit Court of Tennessee had jurisdiction in proceedings for custody
of the children, since the domicile of the children had followed the
domicile of their mother; that a second order of the Oklahoma court
made after the children had moved to Tennessee was not controlling;
9. 95 U.S. 714,726-27 (1877).
10. 354 U.S. at 418-19.
11. 123 Tenn. 482, 131 S.W. 977 (1910).
12. Supra note 3.
13. Supra note 2.
14. Id. at 301.
15. 213 Tenn. 454, 374 S.W.2d 397 (1964).
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and that the circuit court should determine custody "according to the
best interest of the minors."
Strube v. Strube16 was a still more complicated case. A Georgia
court had awarded custody of children to the mother. The mother
moved to Florida taking the children with her, and the father moved
first to New Jersey and later to Tennessee. The father obtained
possession of the children in Tennessee and the mother brought
habeas corpus proceedings to regain possession of them. The court
of appeals affirmed the trial court in giving continuing effect to the
Georgia decree in favor of the mother. Relying on Kenner v. Kenner17
and other cases, Mr. Justice Bejach stated that the Georgia decree
should be deemed res adjudicata as between the parents, though
change of circumstances and the interests of the children might lead
to a change in custody.
C. A Foreign Decree of Probate
Bearman v. Camatson 8 involved a contest for probate over two sets
of testamentary instruments of a deceased Tennessee domiciliary. The
first was a will duly executed in Tennessee, which was offered as in
an original proceeding for probate at the domicile. The second con-
sisted of two instruments originating in Greece, one of which was a
revocation of the Tennessee will, the other a new will. The offer
for probate of the Greek will was supported only by a certified copy
of it and of proceedings in Greece which there "probated" it. The
proponents of the Greek will and probate proceedings relied on
section 32-503 of the Tennessee Code. The Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee conceded that the wording of the code section ("If ...it
appears ...that the will has been duly ...admitted to probate
outside of the state. . . ." ),19 if read literally, would support the
proponents of the Greek will. Speaking through Chief Justice Burnett
it held, however, that the statute should not be read literally and did
not require acceptance of the Greek probate. The decision seems
right. There are two grounds for giving effect to a foreign probate.20
One is the principle of res judicata, protected in interstate cases by
the full faith and credit clause. The second ground is the principle
that the disposition of a decedents movables is governed by the
law of his domicile at death; and a determination by a court of the
domicile in granting probate of a will of the decedent should not be
controverted, as it is a specific application of its law by the court of
16. 379 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963).
17. 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779 (1918).
18. 385 S.W.2d 91 (Tenn. 1964).
19. TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-503 (Supp. 1964).
20. See RESTATEmNT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 470 (1934).
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the domicile to the issue in question. The first principle, res judicata,
was inapplicable in the principal case, for an essential to it is that
the first tribunal had jurisdiction over the parties to the controversy
or else over the thing involved. The Greek tribunal had neither
basis of jurisdiction. The second ground-following a specific applica-
tion of its law by a court of the domicile-was also lacking, since
Greece was not the domicile of the decedent.21 It is worth noting
that counsel and the Supreme Court seemed to assume that the
Tennessee statute gives effect to probate proceedings in another
country as well as to those in another state of the Union. It is wise
in these days of expanding international commerce and relations that
an American court start with the inclination to use the same prin-
ciples for international as for interstate matters. It is important,
however, for the court to assure itself that the parallel is justified. The
parallel may not hold in the present case, for the methods of dealing
with estates of decedents in other countries differ widely from those
in our own.22 It is at best doubtful that the so called "probate" pro-
ceedings in Greece measured up to the formalities and opportunities
to be heard in the kind of probate proceedings contemplated in the
Tennessee statute.23
D. Action on a Sister State Verdict
A matter apparently of first impression was raised in a federal
court: is a verdict of a jury in one state, on which no judgment has
been entered, the basis of an action in a second state? The facts
were that in a Georgia state court an action was brought for damages
for personal injuries, and when the defendants failed to appear the
jury gave the plaintiff a large verdict. The present action was then
brought in a federal court in Tennessee against the Georgia de-
fendants' insurance companies to recover the amount of the verdict
against the insured. The plaintiff pleaded and had certified the
Georgia verdict but failed to plead judgment on the verdict. The
federal judge, Judge Darr, sua sponte dismissed the complaint for
want of jurisdiction.24 In doing so, the Judge took judicial notice of
the law of Georgia which led him to the view that the Georgia
proceedings were not final until there was a judgment. The full faith
and credit statute and the implementing statute grant their protection
21. The parties had stipulated that the decedents "last residence" was in Tennessee,
and the court took this to mean domicile.
22. See Rheinstein, European Methods for the Liquidation of the Debts of Deceased
Persons, 20 IowA L. REv. 431 (1935).
23. See EHRENzwEiG, FRAGISTAS & YiANNOPouLOs, AmmuCAN-GRE= PrvATE INTER-
NAToINAL LAw (1957); 4 RtABn, THE CoNFLIcT OF LAWS, A ComnARAw STUDY
§ 73 (1958).
24. Frazier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 229 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).
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to "judicial proceedings" broadly. As Justice Jackson put it in a
concurring opinion in a case involving the enforcement of a North
Carolina alimony decree in Tennessee:25
Neither the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution nor the Act of
Congress implementing it says anything about final judgments or, for that
matter, about any judgments. Both require that full faith and credit shall
be given 'judicial proceedings' without limitation as to finality.26
Yet Judge Darr's decision seems wise. The Georgia court was com-
posed of the judge as well as the jury. Georgia law, which was
judicially noticed may allow the opening of a default after verdict and
before judgment, and the legal controversy had not been determined
in the Georgia court by the verdict alone. Until determined there
by a judgment, another court should not be asked to give effect to
the Georgia proceedings. The form of the decree of the federal court,
which dismissed the complaint "for want of jurisdiction," may be
open to question. Apparently, the court had jurisdiction in every sense
over the parties and the action. The plaintiff had simply failed to
prove a cause of action.
IV. TORTS
A case in the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee 7 acutely distinguished three problems of coordination
or choice of laws: federal law and state law, the laws of two states,
and two parts of the law of the same state.
A. Problems of Coordination or Choice of Laws
A railroad trainman who resided in Tennessee was killed in a
railroad accident in Georgia. His marital relations were tangled.
While he left a lawful wife and their two legitimate minor children,
at the time of his death he was living with another woman and their
three minor illegitimate children whom he was supporting. The
lawful wife was appointed administratrix of the employee's estate.
She made a settlement with the railroad company without court
approval, though the scope of the release she executed was not clear.
Shortly afterward a second administratrix of the decedent was ap-
pointed in another county, and she brought the present action against
the railroad company under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA). 28 The action was on behalf of the illegitimate dependent
25. Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944).
26. Id. at 87 (concurring opinion).
27. Tune v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 223 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).
28. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958).
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children as well as of the legitimate children and the widow. The
railroad company, relying on the release, moved for summary judg-
ment. The question whether the illegitimate children were to be
included as beneficiaries turned on the source looked to for the mean-
ing of the word "children" in the FELA which gives a right of action
for death "to his [employee's] personal representative, for the benefit
of the surviving widow ...and children of such employee."29
The first problem was whether the meaning of "children" is to be
determined as a matter of federal law or of state law. The Supreme
Court of the United States has not passed on the question, and Judge
Miller found it was unnecessary to do so in this case, since under his
view the word would have the same meaning whether the law of a
state or an independent federal law was used. Ultimately the problem
seems to be one of federal law, as it is a federal statute that is being
applied. But federal law may, instead of having its own distinctive
and self-contained meaning, borrow the meaning from the law of a
state.30
If a distinctive federal law meaning was not to be used, the second
problem arose: to which state's law should the court look; to Georgia,
the place of the fatal accident, or to Tennessee, the home of the
decedent and his two families? Assuming that for the purpose of
choice of law as to negligence in an interstate conflicts case, the law
of the place of the accident would be looked to, the court held that
for the purpose of determining who were the protected beneficiaries
the state of dominant interests was Tennessee.
The predominant consideration here is the legal relationship between these
children and their putative father. The burden of caring for them will fall
on the state in which they reside .... In this respect the state of Georgia
has no interest or concern .... Since the FELA is national in its scope, the
fact that the employee was killed in Georgia should not require a result
different from that which would have obtained had the decedent been
killed in Tennessee.31
This interpretation of the term of a national law is analogous to
the present trend in conflict of laws of the states which looks to the
place of dominant interest as to the particular aspect of the alleged
tort.
32
The last question was "what part of the law of Tennessee should
29. Ibid.
30. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie and of the New Federal Common Law, 19
THm REconD 64 (1964); Miskkin, The Variousness of Federal Law: Competence and
Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules of Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv.
797 (1957).
31. 223 F. Supp. at 931.
32. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
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be considered controlling." The Tennessee Wrongful Death Act,33
as the court found, is a statute of survival which gives "to the
beneficiaries the same right which had belonged to the deceased
prior to his death"- regardless of whether they were his dependents.
The Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act is not a statute of
survival and gives a new and independent right for the benefit of
dependents. The Tennessee Wrongful Death Act does not extend
its benefits to illegitimate children of the deceased; the Workmen's
Compensation Act does so as a part of its purpose to protect his
dependents. The FELA is similar to the latter statute both in its
formal character as creating a new right and in its substantial purpose
to protect dependents. Because of the similarity the court accepted
the meaning of "children" given by the Tennessee Workmen's Com-
pensation Act and held the illegitimate children were protected. The
effect of the release on the claims of any of the beneficiaries and its
validity against an attack of fraud in procurement were reserved for
consideration until the hearing on the merits.
V. CoNrTAcrs
The choice of law to govern the defense of usury in a bank loan
and the rights of one guarantor against his fellow guarantors was
presented in the United States District Court in Nashville. 35 Eight
men, several of them Tennesseans, agreed to guarantee a loan made
by a Texas bank to a Texas corporation in aid of its mining operations
there. The bank made the loan, the borrower corporation was unable
to repay it, and one of the guarantors paid the loan and took an
assignment to himself of the bank's claims. This guarantor pressed
the present action against a co-guarantor in the federal court. The
choice of the governing law was involved as to both a defense of
usury and the scope of the rights of one co-guarantor against another.
The settled principle was followed that the federal court uses the
conflicts rule of the state in which it sits. The Tennessee rule of
choice of law, so the court found, is that the law intended by the
parties will govern, with a presumption they intended to use the law
of the place of making. In the Tennessee Survey article of last year30
it was suggested that the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
would thereafter lead to the use throughout the field of contracts of
the principle set out in the code's principal provision on conflict of
laws. Under the code, as under the Tennessee case the court relied
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-607 (Supp. 1964).
34. 223 F. Supp. at 933.
35. Moody v. Kirkpatrick, 234 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Tenn. 1964).
36. 17 V.x-. L. REv. 937, 938 (1964).
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on, the Texas law would govern in the matter of usury. Similarly,
Texas law was followed in denying a right to the plaintiff to maintain
an action on the note and guaranty and on the guaranty itself, but
in allowing him to maintain a suit for contribution against his co-
obligor. On the scope of recovery in contribution the federal court
stated this is a matter of remedy to be governed by the law of
the forum. This view of the scope of liability may be open to question;
but the court's conclusion that on a matter of this importance the
federal court in Tennessee should do what the Tennessee state court
would do seems clearly right, for as the judge stated:
the outcome in the federal court should not be materially different from
that which would prevail in the courts of the state regardless of whether
the issue is one of substantive or procedural law.37
37. 234 F. Supp. at 542, citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).

